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THE OWNERSHIP OF INDIVISIBLE INPUTS AND 
THE AGGLOMERATION OF RESOURCES 
Authors normally a s s o c i a t e ,  t h e  agglomeration of resources  a t  s i n g l e  geo- 
g raph ica l  l o c a t i o n s  wi th  t h e  presence of  i n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s ;  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  
we at tempt  t o  go beyond t h a t  a s soc ia t ion  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  two f a c t o r s  
which appear t o  a f f e c t  t h e  tendency of resources  t o  agglomerate s p a t i a l l y .  
These f a c t o r s  are t h e  ownership of the i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t  and t h e  u t i l i t y  
func t ions  of t h e  en t repreneurs  o f  the f i rms  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t s .  
I. THE TRADITIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
RESOURCE AGGLOMERATION AND THE INDIVISIBLE INPUTS 
Any d i scuss ion  of agglomeration seems t o  b e n e f i t  from a benchmark r e f e r -  
ence t o  Alf red  Weber. 
t h e  spokesman f o r  t h e  au thors  who have considered t h e  s u b j e c t  of agglomerat ion 
wi th  t h e  acknowledgement t h a t  embellishments upon h i s  e a r l y  work have produced 
few s i g n i f i c a n t  changes. 
I n  t h i s  present  a n a l y s i s ,  w e  p re sen t  Al f red  Weber as 
Weber i d e n t i f i e d  agglomeration economies and agglomeration diseconomies 
1 
as f o r c e s  which a l l o c a t e  i n d u s t r i e s  s p a t i a l l y  w i t h i n  a reg ion .  
Weber, t h e s e  economies are assoc ia ted  wi th  two d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of economic 
o rgan iza t ion .  A t  t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l ,  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  of product ive  f a c t o r s  o r  
economies of s c a l e  ob ta inab le  by expanding a s i n g l e  p l a n t . 2  A t  t h e  second 
l e v e l ,  t h e  agglomerat ive f a c t o r s  a r e  advantages ob ta inab le  from t h e  c l o s e  
a s s o c i a t i o n  of s e v e r a l  p l a n t s .  Of course,  i t  i s  t h e  second type of agglomer- 
a t i v e  f a c t o r  w i th  which w e  are concerned i n  t h i s  paper .  
According t o  
3 
1. Alf red  Weber, Theory of Location of I n d u s t r i e s ,  t r a n s l a t i o n  C. F r i e d r i c k  
(Chicago: Univers i ty  of Chicago Press, 1929, p. 124. 
2. I b i d  - 9  P .  1 2 7 .  
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Among t h e  advantages der ived  from l o c a t i n g  s e v e r a l  p l a n t s  i n  c l o s e ,  common 
s p a t i a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  Weber i d e n t i f i e d  " the development of t e c h n i c a l  equipment. 114 
The complete t e c h n i c a l  equipment which i s  necessary t o  
c a r r y  ou t  a process  of production may i n  h i g h l y  developed 
i n d u s t r i e s  become so  spec ia l i zed  t h a t  minute p a r t s  of t h e  
process  of product ion u t i l i z e  spec ia l i zed  machines and t h a t  
even q u i t e  l a rge - sca l e  p l a n t s  a r e  no t  a b l e  t o  make f u l l  t i m e  use  
of such equipment. Such spec ia l i zed  machines must then,  to- 
g e t h e r  w i th  t h e i r  own parts of t h e  process  of product ion,  b e  
taken  out  of t h e  s i n g l e  l a r g e  p lan t  and must work f o r  s e v e r a l  of 
O f  course ,  t h i s  s p e c i a l i z e d ,  t echn ica l  equipment descr ibed  by 
Weber i s  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of i n d i v i s i b i l i t y  of equipment. 
them, i.e. , become t h e  b a s i s  of independent a u x i l i a r y  i n d u s t r i e s .  5 
The l i t e r a t u r e  which cons iders  t he  agglomerat ion of product ive  resources  
hac nnt gnne hoynnrl t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  of t h i s  phenomenon w i t h  t h e  presence of 
i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t s .  
of t h e s e  inpu t s  upon t h e  tendency of resources  t o  agglomerate.  
I n  t h i s  ana lys i s  w e  cons ider  t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  ownership 
11. THE SEPARATE OWNERSHIP OF THE INDIVISIBLE INPUT 
We can i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  method of a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e  s e r v i c e s  of a i  i n d i -  
c 
v i s i b l e  inpu t  between two f i rms  when t h e  inpu t  is owned by a s e p a r a t e  f i r m  by 
use  of an example. This  separate firm, c a l l e d  t h e  s u p p l i e r  of t h e  services 
of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t ,  i s  motivated t o  a l l o c a t e  t h e  services of t h e  ind i -  
v i s i b l e  inpu t  i n  a manner such t h a t  the  p r o f i t s  of t h e  s u p p l i e r  are maximized. 
For  purposes of t h i s  example, we denote  t h e  p r o f i t  of t h e  s u p p l i e r  as nS. 
' 
W e  denote  t h e  revenue from s e l l i n g  the s e r v i c e s  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t  t o  
4 .  I b i d . ,  p. 128. 
5. I b i d  0 ,  PP. 128-129. 
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f i r m  1 as R l ( r l )  rhich is  a func t ion  of t h e  number of i n i t s  of t h e  service 
s o l d .  Likewise, w e  denote  t h e  revenue from sales of t h e  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e  second 
f i r m  as R 2 ( r 2 ) .  Since t h e  c o s t  of supplying t h e  s e r v i c e  i s  a func t ion  of t h e  
number of s e r v i c e s  provided t o  both f i r m  1 and 2 ,  w e  can form equat ion  (1) as 
a p r o f i t  func t ion  of t h e  s u p p l i e r .  
71 = R1(rl)  + R2(r2)  - C ( r ,  = r2) 
S 
(1) 
For purposes of a n a l y s i s ,  w e  f u r t h e r  assume t h a t  C is a smooth d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  
f u n c t i o n  which is convex upward throughout t h e  range r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  a n a l y s i s .  
S ince  t h e  f i rms  purchasing t h e  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  i n p u t  would n o t  pay t h e  p r i c e  
_ _ _  -Jz *L- ----.. 2 - - 
aSLVALca  uLC i ; r r  i u p u L  w i l i c i i  exceeds che va lue  or  t n e  marginal  
product ,  w e  can rewrite t h e  p r o f i t  func t ion  of t h e  s u p p l i e r  as equat ion  (2)  
where X 1 ( r  ,...) and X 2 ( r  ,...) are t h e  ou tput  of f i rms  1 and 2 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and 
p1 and p, are t h e  p r i c e s  of t h e s e  outputs .  
- C (rl = r2) 
From (2) t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  condi t ions  f o r  t h e  maximization of t h e  p r o f i t  of 
t h e  s u p p l i e r  are equat ions  (3.a) and (3.b) .  
a n  = r l  + p2 ax, - dC (rl = r2) = 0 
- -  S 
(3  a) 
ar, d r ,  
ans = [p, ax, ) r2  + p2 ax, - dC(r,  + rs) = 0 
- .  
(3 .b)  
Since  
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Equation ( 4 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  sum of t h e  va lue  of t h e  marginal  product  of t h e  
services of t h e  inpu t  and a weighted rate of change i n  t h e  va lue  of t h e  marginal  
product  must equal  t h e  marginal  cos t  of supplying t h e  t o t a l  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  ind i -  
v i s i b l e  inpu t .  From t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w e  may conclude t h a t  t h e  two u s e r  f i rms  
would b e  charged the  same i n p u t  p r i ces  only i f  t h e i r  marginal  product  func t ions  
w e r e  i d e n t i c a l .  That is  t o  say ,  the s u p p l i e r  maximizes p r o f i t s  by p r i c e  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  between t h e  two f i rms.  
2 2 
Furthermore,  a nega t ive  3x1 and 8x2 ( a  necessary  second o rde r  cond i t ion )  
2 
ar2 ar 
l e a d s  t o  t h e  immediate conclusion t h a t  s e p a r a t e  ownership of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t  
l e a d s  t o  a lesser u t i l i z a t i o n  of the i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t  than  t h e  usage r e f l e c t e d  
i n  usage where t h e  va lue  of t h e  marginal product  equa l s  t h e  marginal  c o s t  of t h e  
services of t h e  input .  
111. JOINT-OWNERSHIP OF THE INDIVISIBLE INPUT 
Although t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  "theory of agglomeration" does n o t  cons ider  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  problem, w e  can probably assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some impl i ca t ion  t h a t  
-5- 
au thor s  expect  j o i n t  ownership among t h e  two u s e r  f i rms  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  
i n p u t  t o  p r e v a i l .  S ince  both  of the  u s e r  f i rms  are p r o f i t  maximizers, t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  complicates  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  Not only must t h e  use r  f i r m  cons ider  
the level of ou tput ,  t h e  l e v e l  of i npu t s  ( inc luding  t h e  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  ind i -  
v i s i b l e  inpu t )  i n  i t s  p r o f i t  maximizing c a l c u l u s ,  b u t  t h e  f i r m  must cons ider  
a l s o  t h e  s h a r e  of t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  
problem is  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  a l l o c a t i n g  c o s t s  of t h e  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  ind i -  
v i s i b l e  i n p u t ,  because t h e  marginal  c o s t  of t h e  s e r v i c e s  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  
inpu t  i s  d e c l i n i n g  and a u n i t  charge equa l  t o  t h e  marginal  c o s t  of t h e  l a s t  
u n i t  of s e r v i c e  taken w i l l  n o t  recover  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  
inpu t .  Some b a s i s  f o r  a l l o c a t i n g  the t o t a l  c o s t s  of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t  
is  necessary ;  t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n  appears t o  conform r e a d i l y  t o  t h e  two-person 
coope ra t ive  game. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern6 have poin ted  ou t  t h a t  s o  long as a co- 
o p e r a t i v e  payoff p a i r s  f o r  t h e  t w o  f i rms is  a t  least as g r e a t  as t h e  nonco- 
o p e r a t i v e  payoff p a i r s ,  t h e  two f i rms  would cooperate. .  For example, i n  
F igu re  1 t h e  noncooperat ive payoff p a i r  of ( u l ,  u2) i s  less d e s i r a b l e  t o  
f i r m  1 than  ( u ~ ' ,  u2 ' ) .  
o b t a i n a b l e  by cooperat ion exceeds ( u l ,  u2) .  Since f i r m  2 does n o t  have t o  
However, any p o i n t  i n  t h e  shaded area which i s  
take any p a i r  less d e s i r a b l e  than  (ul ,  u 2 ) ,  ( u l ' ,  u 2 ' )  is unobta inable  by 1. 
Firm 1 is,  t h e r e f o r e ,  motivated t o  cooperate  wi th  f i r m  2 i n  achiev ing  a 
p o i n t  on t h e  boundary ab of t h e  shaded area. The motivat ion f o r  f i rm  2 i s  
6 .  Von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oscar, Theory of G a m e s  and Economic 
Behavior,  (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc . ,  1964),  p. 236. 
-6- 
similar v i s  a V i s  t h e  p a i r s  (u s ,  u2) and (ul  11 u2If). --- 
2 ' s  
u t i l i t y  
1's 
u t i l i t y  
FIGURE 1 
There have been s e v e r a l  a t tempts  t o  s i n g l e  out  t h e  p o i n t  on t h e  l i n e  
segment ab t h a t  t h e  two p a r t i e s  would reach through " f a i r "  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The 
basis of t h e  agreement on t h i s  po in t  is  t h a t  t h e r e  should be  a p o i n t  where 
t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  ga in  by a p a r t y  provides  t h e  amount of s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  h e  
should expect  t o  g e t .  Being r a t i o n a l ,  he  agrees  t o  t h i s  po in t .  One such 
method has  been developed by Nash. 7 
7. Nash, John F.,  "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Vol.  XVIII, 
A p r i l ,  1950. 
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Nash's procedure f o r  choosing t h i s  po in t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  fo l lowing  
assumptions : 
(1) u1 and u2 
(2) t h e  set S 
(3) t h e  p o i n t  
are t h e  u t i l i t y  func t ions  of two i n d i v i d u a l s  
is  compact and convex, 
of no ba rga in  (no j o i n t  u t i l i z a t i o n )  g ives  
I 
zero  payoff ,  (ua, u2) ; 
1 1 
( 4 )  i f  (ul  , u2 ) i n  S r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  
and u2 > u2 , 1 1 is no p o i n t  ( u l ,  u2) such t h a t  u l>  u 1 
(5) i f  T w e r e  t h e  se t  of poss ib l e  ba rga ins  which con ta ins  S ,  
then  i f  c(T) were contained i n  S ,  c(T) = c (S) ,  
( 6 )  i f  S is  symmetric8,then c(S) i s  a p o i n t  on the  l i n e  u1 = u2. 
From t h e s e  assumptions Nash demonstrates t h a t  t h e  po in t  c(S)  is  t h e  p o i n t  
where ul* u2* i s  t h e  maximum of a l l  products  u1 u2. Convexity a s s u r e s  t h a t  
t h i s  p o i n t  is  unique. 
FIGURE 2 
ul* u2* 
8. We d e f i n e  S t o  be  symmetrical  i f  (a ,b)  is  i n  S and (b,a)  i s  a l s o  i n  S .  
- 8- 
IV. SUMMARY 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  w e  observed in  our  a n a l y s i s  of s e p a r a t e  ownership of 
an  i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t  t h a t  t h e  owner of t h e  i n p u t  would res t r ic t  t h e  avail- 
a b i l i t y  of t h e  service of t h e  i n p u t  t o  t h e  two use r  f i rms  and d i sc r imina te  
between them i n  p r i c e .  This  act ivi ty  would dampen t h e  expansion of t h e  use r  
f i rms ,  i .e. ,  diminish t h e  impact of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t  of t h e  tendency of 
resources  t o  agglomerate s p a t i a l l y .  
The j o i n t  ownership of t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e  i n p u t  l eads  t o  a barga in ing  
s o l u t i o n  between t h e  two f i rms  concerning t h e  l e v e l  of u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  
i n d i v i s i b l e  inpu t  and thereby t h e  s i z e  of t h e  agglomeration. A p r e r e q u i s i t e  
never.acknowledged i n  t h e  "theory of agglomeration" is  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of 
u t i l i t y  func t ions  f o r  t h e  en t repreneurs  of t h e  use r  f i rms  which l e a d s  t o  a 
s t a b  l e  s o l u t i o n .  
